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The developing discipline of Food Crime requires the analysis of food safety 
responsibility from a critical structural perspective. Analyzing the Canadian dairy 
industry, this project seeks to answer how the legal definition of food safety impacts the 
production practices of farmers, and where farmers place the burden of food safety 
responsibility, while partially testing institutional anomie theory. A legal discourse 
analysis of food safety law in Canada is performed to contextualize individual interviews 
with six active family-farmers in rural southern Ontario in order to determine how dairy 
farmers experience food safety legislation. As hypothesized, farmers experience food 
safety law through forms of disempowerment and alienation involving dairy production 
products, leading to a partial displacement of responsibility for safe food. The ideas of 
institutional anomie theory were insignificant or inconclusive for these case studies. 
More research is required to determine potential policy implications concerning the 
safety of Canadian food. 
Keywords: food safety, farmers, institutional anomie, alienation,  
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Milking anomie: Experiencing food safety on Canadian dairy farms 
Canadians are increasingly concerned with food safety. Due to the presence of a 
variety of food disease outbreaks, such as the Maple Leaf Foods listeriosis outbreak in 
2008 (see Hatt & Hatt, 2011), the 2006 case of Bolthouse Farms carrot juice containing 
botulism toxins (see CBC, 2006), and Canada’s largest recall concerning XL Foods beef 
products in 2012 (see The Huffington Post Canada, 2012), awareness of how food is 
produced and manufactured is a growing concern in the everyday lives of Canadians. 
This is also a global concern within the context of international food trade expansion, as 
research by the World Health Organization shows a worldwide increase in foodborne 
illnesses and emerging diseases linked to food production (WHO, 2013). World rankings 
place Canada second-last in the category of effective traceability of food, an important 
step in maintaining food safety (Food in Canada: Eat at your own risk, 2011). 
Individually, this level of concern is not surprising, as Nestle (2003) offers the reminder 
that the food industry is universally unique in the fact that everybody eats.  
The milk industry across Canada is not exempt from the pressures of food safety. 
For example, on January 27th, 2012, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) 
initiated a recall after at least one woman became sick. The recall stated that the two 
percent variety of Neilson Trutaste milk may have been contaminated with cleaning 
solution (CBC News, January 27 2012; The Star, January 27 2012). It is not necessarily 
only the CFIA that issues recall notices. Some recalls are issued by food companies 
themselves and made public by news media sources. For example, in August 2012, 
Agropur Division Natrel voluntarily recalled several of its Sealtest and Mac Milk 





August 3 2012). In this case the public was informed that a problem existed, but the 
nature of that problem was concealed.  Further, not all cases of food contamination or 
food products lacking ‘quality’ are brought to the public's attention at all. It is estimated 
that less than 0.5% of food-related gastroenteritis cases are actually reported in Canada 
every year (Food in Canada: Eat at your own risk, 2011). Therefore it is important to 
understand food safety both within and beyond the food recall process.  
Simultaneously individuals significantly trust the food system, believing its 
products are safe (van Rijswijk & Frewer, 2008). This may be partially due to the 
perception of food harm as trivial, which is often considered a consumer issue rather than 
a serious crime (Croall, 2006). Together, the increasing food safety concerns and the 
continued confidence in the system, suggest that Canadians may be at risk of significant 
harm in a system where food production and consumption are covertly separated and 
sealed with a curtain of trust. The question becomes, given this rift, where does 
responsibility for safe food lie? 
Current Inquiry 
Within the Canadian dairy industry, this analysis will start at the ‘beginning’ 
production stage – the farm, where milk originates. However, the dairy industry is 
significantly interconnected within the food system, due to being a fundamental 
ingredient in many food products including cheese, yogurt, milk powders, and ice-cream, 
as well its connections to other industries including, but not limited to, beef, veal, leather, 
gelatin, as well as an (often hidden) ingredient in a  multitude of processed and packaged 





becomes a prominent concern, and provides significant justification for studying the food 
safety of milk products.  
More specifically, this thesis will involve an analysis of the implications of 
Canadian dairy laws and regulations upon how dairy farmers produce milk and who they 
believe is responsible for the safety of milk. The study is driven by research questions 
which ask: How does the legal definition of food safety impact the production practices 
of dairy farmers? Consequently, who do dairy farmers see as those (most) responsible for 
ensuring food safety during the production of milk products?  
These questions will be analyzed through both an exploratory (inductive) and 
theory-testing (deductive) model. Therefore, this thesis encompasses a form of abductive 
research, which encompasses creative inferencing coupled with double-checking via 
additional data (see Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Abduction effectively arose in 
reaction to the somewhat failure of grounded theory to construct new explanations as 
well as the limit of deductive reasoning to look beyond the consequences of hypotheses 
(see Timmermans & Tavory, 2012; Peirce, 1934). Prior to data collection and analysis, it 
is hypothesized that dairy farmers will experience food safety regulation as a 
disempowering feature that (further) forms an alienated relationship to both dairy 
production and the milk product. The decreasing control farmers experience within milk 
production, and their alienated state in the modern dairy environment, will lead farmers 
to not feel significantly responsible for (producing) milk, but they will deflect blame onto 








Food safety responsibility discourse, within the modern neoliberal context, is 
predominately framed at the consumption level. This focus transcends social and health 
science academia, including research on food handlers’ food safety knowledge (see 
Hislop & Shaw, 2009), consumers food handling practices in the home (see Nesbitt et al., 
2009), and food labeling debates to ensure responsible consumption (see Tavernier, 
2012). Food safety is the responsibility of consumers, determined by their rational 
decision-making practices. Responsibility for safe food is placed in the home, in the 
hands of consumers, with less concern for the origins of that food and the processes the 
food products take to reach those consumers.  
However, when the production level of the system is analyzed, responsibility for 
safe food continues to be placed on specific actors within the production system. For 
example, Young et al. (2010) studied boiler-chicken producers’ perceptions toward a 
provincial-implemented food safety program, to find a discrepancy between the practices 
of farmers and their knowledge of practices associated with (un)safe food production, 
which led many farmers to engage in practices that they did not know caused unsafe 
food. In examining the practices of small-scale farmers on their farms and at local farmer 
markets, Harrison et al. (2013) conclude that farmers need better training in order to limit 
the risk of food illness to consumers. Specifically in the dairy industry, researchers focus 
on how to improve food safety at the farm level (Valeeva, Meuwissen, Bergevoet, 
Lansink, & Huirne, 2005). Even on a global scale, food safety responsibility is not 
embraced systematically. For example, small-scale farmers in developing nations which 





enter the global trade (Hall, Ehui, & Delgado, 2004). All these authors conclude by 
suggesting a solution involving some form of increasing farmer education. Food safety is 
an individualized concern within contemporary neoliberal discourse. However, the 
perspective of this thesis (along with Croall, 2013; Brisman, 2009), demands that food 
safety responsibility be problematized within a broader socio-political context.  
In effect, the workings of the modern food system make it illogical to 
individualize food safety responsibility. As previously acknowledged, overall consumers 
trust the food system. However, this trust does not impact individual’s consumption 
behaviour according to studies in both Europe and Canada (van Rijswijk & Frewer, 2008; 
Drescher, de Jonge, Goddard, & Herzfeld, 2012). The element of trust means there is a 
relationship of dependence between the food producers and the consumers. As a 
dependent system, modern agriculture must be studied as a whole, where the production-
consumption relationship must be placed within the broader ideologies and methods of 
the food system. This becomes more important when considering evidence of farmers 
internalizing self-blame for food safety within neoliberal culture, as Halpin and Guilfoyle 
(2005) found with family-farmers in Australia. But even when food adultery does occur 
by individuals’ decisions and actions, there is a significant role for the culture 
surrounding those individuals which make many actors within the food industry forced to 
cheat (Croall, 2006; Hall & Farrall, 2013). These ideas make it illogical to hold 
individuals as purely responsible for food safety. Rather, as Hazel Croall (2013) argues, 
there is a need to understand food crime from a green criminological perspective, where 





Many studies have found that the processes of industrialization and neoliberalism 
have had a significant negative effect on agriculture. The dairy system specifically has 
largely been (re)organized into an agribusiness-oriented structure that has fabricated farm 
dependence, concentration, and agri-complexity, which all have implications for dairy 
farmers. While understanding that the modern dairy farmer is both a producer (selling 
milk to processors) and a consumer (purchasing quota, feed, veterinary drugs), White 
(2002) argues that farmers end up losing some control and authority through the 
connection of the producer role to consumer habits linked to agribusiness. 
Simultaneously, in their producer role, farmers face an increasingly concentrated 
industry, where only three milk processing companies (of the four hundred and fifty 
across Canada) are in charge of processing nearly eighty percent of the fluid milk 
(Canadian Dairy Information Centre, July 11, 2012). According to Marsden (1998) these 
capitalist agricultural systems are better classified as vertical, not horizontal, 
relationships – a change which necessitates the role of traceability systems in order to 
help maintain food safety standards within modern agri-complexity (Popper, 2007). 
However, due to this complexity of the agricultural industry, effective traceability is 
more difficult to create (Food in Canada: Eat at your own risk, 2011), especially since 
farmers are becoming just a small part of the entire food production system (Toews, 
2008). Without effective traceability, including public scrutiny, farmers feel less pressure 
to produce safe products (White, 2002). Altogether, these processes of neoliberal 
agribusiness may be alienating farmers from their industries. 
In particular, this loss of control has a significant impact on family-farmers. While 





on local communities for supplementary off-farm employment, as well as favourable 
governing political policies (Smithers & Johnson, 2004; Calus & Van Huylenbroeck, 
2010). However, the persistence of local communities is also dependent on the survival 
of family-farms. As Smithers, Johnson, and Joseph (2004) found in their study of Ontario 
farming communities, the elimination of family-farms often resulted in those 
communities disappearing. In the overall picture, family-farms have become a relatively 
small element within the organization of the dairy industry (Roberts, 1996), but may be 
very important parts of modern society. 
Regardless of their dependence and size in comparison to the industry, family-
farms are in a unique position which has allowed their survival. While family-farms are 
economically pressured by agribusiness demands, they maintain control of the biological 
growth stages of farming (Roberts, 1996). On one hand, Canadian dairy farmers are in 
control of their labour, but on the other hand, they are influenced by neoliberal 
agribusiness organization of an industry which limits farmer control (Toews, 2008). This 
partial level of agency has helped enable the persistence of family-farms across Canada, 
to the point where most dairy farms across the country continue to be family-owned 
(Muirhead & Campbell, 2012). Calus and Van Huylenbroeck (2010) argue this agency of 
family-farmers is connected to the inherent flexibility of their decisions to accept lower 
standards of living, dismiss a division between work and leisure, and the use of cheap, 
long, and hard farm labour. Thus dairy farmers in Canada are in a unique position, where 
they are in control and being controlled simultaneously, which Toews (2008) explains 
through labeling farmers as a ‘petite-bourgeois’ caught in an illusion of independence 





Therefore this thesis seeks to connect two main themes – the individualization of 
food safety responsibility and the illusion of control dairy farmers have over producing 
food – through a structural perspective of harm. Three recent studies have begun 
recognizing elements of this connection. Halpin and Guilfoyle (2005) utilized attribution 
theory to examine the extent which Australian farmers accept responsibility for the 
failure or success of farming within a political environment of individualism. The results 
of the survey questionnaire indicated that although the primary concerns of family-
farmers were structural factors, the common response to situations were individual based 
reactions. Thus the individualized responsibility ideology is being internalized by farmers 
(Halpin & Guilfoyle, 2005). However, Hongming Cheng (2012) interviewed a variety of 
individuals involved in the food industry in China, from farmers to regulation officers, to 
find a general perception that the food system’s ‘cheapness propaganda’ is responsible 
for unsafe food due to an emphasis on profit maximization. In North America, Gabriela 
Pechlaner (2012) questioned the extent of corporate-driven organization of agricultural 
production and to what extent this impacts the level of control Canadian and American 
farmers have over production. Her results from interviews support her hypothesis that 
farmers and producers are experiencing reduced control over production through 
capitalist methods of ‘expropriationism’, or the dispossession of farmer control to 
agribusiness forms (Pechlaner, 2012).  
This structure of mass cultural food ‘cheapness’ and agribusiness formations, 
combined with individualized responsibility, means that farmers experience a reduced 
level of power in producing (safe) food, while blaming themselves as responsible for that 





focusing on the legal entrenchment of the neoliberal-agribusiness context and its impact 
on dairy farmers’ production habits and their feelings of food safety responsibility. It is 
important to reiterate that blame is not the purpose of this research. Rather, the focus on 
structure and culture moves away from blame to a goal of understanding individuals’ 
experience of modern agriculture. 
Theoretical Framework 
Food safety responsibility can be understood using a perspective built upon the 
ideas of Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2001) institutional anomie theory integrated with 
Marxist perspectives (see Sims, 1997). The theoretical model includes two main 
independent ‘variables’ which simultaneously impact food safety regulation and dairy 
farmers’ production processes: The modern neoliberal culture/ideology, and an 
agribusiness structured industry. The main dependent ‘variable’ is the dairy farmers’ 
perception of food safety responsibility, which is impacted by farmer alienation caused 
by the neoliberal culture and agribusiness structure and influenced by the spatial 
environment. This theory is labeled the agricultural-anomie-alienation theoretical 
framework (see Figure 1).  
Institutional anomie (IA) theory constructs a more complete explanation of crime 
by including an analysis of the structure of society, along with the American Dream 
culture as motivating social (criminal) behaviour (Maume & Lee, 2003). High levels of 
crime occur in modern capitalist societies due to a dominance of economic institutions 
over social institutions, where these social institutions are no longer able to regulate 
individual behaviour toward social values (or non-economic values), but have been 





same goals (Bernburg, 2002; Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008; Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; 
Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001; Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997). This structure is accompanied 
by the overarching drive for – often monetary – goals within the American Dream 
culture, which instigates a state of anomie where the means to reach such goals are 
governed only by efficient individual competition (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001). The 
pressures of the American Dream culture and the institutional imbalance of advanced 
capitalist societies concurrently impact social behaviour and lead to higher levels of harm 
(Chamlin & Cochran, 2007; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001; Passas & Agnew, 1997).   




In order to utilize Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2001) theory to explain the social 
behaviour of family-farmers, these two key ‘variables’ are slightly redesigned in 
accordance with the context of Canadian dairy farms. First, the American Dream anomic 
culture is relabeled ‘neoliberal culture’ since the concept of the American Dream has 





analysis beyond that limitation to other societies and environments which embrace a 
similar culture of mass consumption amid capitalist values and practices (see Sims, 
1997). Largely due to processes of globalization (see Kotz, 2002), regardless of the 
particular political initiation and maintenance of neoliberal policy, the culture of 
neoliberalism is regularly witnessed across the world and continually reproduced within 
cultural phenomena (Gilbert, 2013). Its definition, although contested, involves the 
shared beliefs, at an institutional level, that individual self-interest is the sole life force 
which is best achieved via competition (Hilgers, 2012; Gilbert, 2013). Similarly, Ventura 
(2012) argues that neoliberal culture encompasses the ideology of consumer choice as the 
focus of individual existence.  
Such an understanding of neoliberalism overlaps with Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
concept of the American Dream, defined as “an environment in which people are 
encouraged to adopt an ‘anything goes’ mentality in the pursuit of personal goals” (2001, 
p. 61). This individualism is conditioned through competition to the point where social 
norms are unable to regulate the goals, or means to reach those goals (Bernburg, 2002), 
and creates a state of anomie which pressures individuals to use illegitimate means 
regardless if that ensues criminal engagement (Passas & Agnew, 1997). The base of 
similar ideas (individualism, universalism, competition) as determining human behaviour 
justifies the consideration of a neoliberal culture as a broader explanation of the 
American Dream.  
While one variable is generalized to extend beyond the American political 
environment, the second variable is redefined to a narrower understanding, as suited to 





power is characterized through the increasing agribusiness structure of the dairy system, 
in comparison to the familial institution (re: family-farm). Although Messner and 
Rosenfeld include three noneconomic institutions in their theory (polity, education, and 
family) this analysis will emphasize the family because it ought to be a significant 
consideration in the lives of family-farmers, and it is considered the most resistant (of the 
three) to economic accommodation and penetration (see Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001), 
thus requiring in-depth study which qualitative methods can assess.  
It can even be argued that the shift in the labour organization within agriculture to 
agribusiness formation itself exemplifies the dominance of economic institutions. For 
instance, the removal of state support (see Martin, 2010), deregulation (see Franklin, 
1999), the importance of new technology in remaining efficient (see Toews, 2008), and 
the standardization of practices (see Smithers & Johnson, 2004) are values associated 
with monetary success at the expense of social values like supporting local farms, 
regulatory advocating for safe food production, tradition, and creativity, respectively. The 
current pressures of the economy construct what Griffith, Livesey, and Clayton (2010) 
define as a negative safety culture, where business values are prioritized over social 
values of safe food. Similarly, the value of safe food will be influential only if it affects 
product sales (Nestle, 2003).  
 Therefore this thesis seeks to both enhance and partially test IA theory. By 
studying the outcome as food-related harm, instead of violent crime, this thesis expands 
the potential explanatory power of IA theory. This has been accomplished by researchers 
studying a variety of different types of crimes, beyond instrumental crimes and 





success (for example see Chamlin & Cochran, 1995; Maume & Lee, 2003). It should be 
noted however, that food crimes are still very serious in nature, as the threat of bodily 
harm can be quite significant when involving food contamination, as exemplified in 
terrible cases such as Maple Leaf Foods where multiple people died (see Hatt & Hatt, 
2011). Thus analyzing food crimes is not a large stretch from violent categorization, as 
exemplified by Cheng (2012), who successfully utilized and found support for IA theory 
while studying food crime in China.  
Simultaneously, this thesis will try to respond to a criticism of IA theory by 
Jensen (2002), who argues that there is a lack of evidence of the American Dream values 
being embraced, particularly in the case of economic values overpowering family values. 
Jensen (2002) attempts to rectify this at a macro level through analyzing the importance 
associated with institutional values, but fails to understand exactly what those values are. 
Therefore this thesis aims to partially test (emphasizing the family) IA theory while 
improving its explanatory power through the use of qualitative micro-analytical research 
to better understand the definition and the extent of the socialization of these values. 
Further, this thesis also seeks to enhance the explanatory power of IA theory by 
supplementing it with Marxist thought. Barbara Sims (1997) argues that the two theories 
can be readily integrated to enhance the overall level of explanation through addressing 
the capitalist context where inequalities arise. More central to this analysis is the concept 
of alienation, which according to Smith and Bohm (2008) contains anomie (re: 
Durkheim’s [2004] normlessness) as one of its dimensions (see Seeman, 1959, for his 
alienation typology). However, anomie is rarely linked to alienation due to the radical 





to continue to reinforce mainstream criminology (Smith & Bohm, 2008). But both 
concepts did originate from a radical reaction to a social and historical context of self-
interest motivated individuals desiring indefinite goals (Horton, 1964). Given this 
historical connection and the conceptual relation between the two terms, their coinciding 
inclusion in a theoretical framework is justified.  
Therefore, in regards to the hypotheses, farmers are in a unique and complicated 
situation. Canadian dairy farmers are “small producers, who are relatively independent in 
determining their own labour process” (p. 20), but this is actually a false sense of control 
over their personal production practices (Toews, 2008; see also Roberts, 1996). The 
alienation of dairy farmers from the dairy system (powerless in determining their 
production behaviour and decreased control in the safety of the end milk product) 
overpowers any minimal discretion they think they may possess in their daily farming 
activities. Alienation here is based on Marx’s concept of the objectification of labour, 
where the product (re: object) of labour has an independence from the worker to which 
the worker becomes a servant, as well as the work itself as forced and contrary to 
intrinsic nature (Marx, 1844). Dairy farmers are both alienated from their labour and the 
milk product. Note that the impact of ‘spatial environment’ was added to the agricultural-
anomie-alienation theoretical model through inductive methods and will be discussed in 
the discussion section. 
This means that dairy farmers do not want to create unsafe milk, but they are 
struggling in a competitive political economy that sometimes gives them no other choice 
but to perform unsafe milk production practices or produce unsafe milk. In line with IA 





they produce that milk is regulated only by self-interest via producing milk in the most 
technically efficient means possible, thus by any means necessary (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
2001). Together these understandings have important consequences on farmers’ 
perceptions of food safety responsibility. If dairy farmers do not have sufficient control 
over the production of milk or the milk product, due to being pressured by neoliberal 
values in an agribusiness-structured system, then the farmers also do not have sufficient 
control over how safe that system and its products are. Here it is clear to see the 
importance of taking a systemic perspective within a critical theory, since otherwise the 
blame for (un)safe milk lies with fragments of the dairy industry without acknowledging 
the power relations within that system.  
Methods 
This thesis employs two methods to analyze how Canadian food safety laws and 
regulations impact dairy farmers production practices and their perceptions of food safety 
responsibility. First, an analysis of the legal texts involved in Canadian dairy production 
was performed in order to contextualize the legal experience of dairy farmers, which 
includes an examination of how the legal texts are connected to the ideas of a neoliberal 
culture, construct or maintain the agribusiness structure, as well as how the law defines 
food safety and where it places responsibility for safe food. The analysis focuses on the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency Act (1997), and all the laws and regulations which the 
CFIA administers and enforces (controlling for dairy production involvement) including 
the Food and Drugs Act (1985), the Food and Drugs Regulations (1978), the Canada 
Agricultural Products Act (1985), the Dairy Product Regulations (1979), the Health of 





given to government-based websites concerning the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
and the Canadian Dairy Commission Act (1985) for the purposes of comparison, contrast, 
or detail.  
The laws and regulations were electronically downloaded from the Government 
of Canada’s Justice Laws website (http://laws.justice.gc.ca) throughout June 2013. 
Questions asked included: How is food safety defined and enforced, including the role of 
farmers? How are the ideas of responsibility portrayed within the regulations? Overall, to 
what extent does neoliberal ideology and agribusiness structure influence the legal 
regulations involving food safety? Such questions within this investigation are based on 
Phillips and Hardy’s (2002) categorization of critical discourse analysis, where 
examination centers on how issues of contextual power, privilege, and (dis)advantage 
impact the legal texts. This is a crucial perspective for this thesis in particular, as it deals 
with issues of blame and control via responsibility, but also for Food Crime research in 
general, as there is a need to analyze the growing systemic ideologies and processes 
which connect the producer to the consumer. However the primary purpose of this 
method is to contextualize the legal environment of dairy farmers in Canada. In order to 
understand how dairy farmers legally experience food safety, it must first be understood 
how the law defines food safety. 
The second method involved six semi-structured personal interviews with dairy 
farmers, which lasted 100 minutes on average. The decision to use semi-structured 
interviews was predominately justified by the subject matter and themes within the 
research questions. As Harvey-Jordan and Long (2001) argue, semi-structured interviews 





experiences of farmers, this form of qualitative research enabled stories to be told 
however the participants desired to tell them. Allowing some openness within the 
interview structure was meant to limit the problematic use of more controlled 
questionnaires among a fairly heterogeneous group (see Barriball, 1994) of farmers with 
differing ages, farm histories, education, etc.  
After attaining ethical clearance, initial contact to potential participants came 
through personal connections, and a list of active dairy farmers was constructed through 
‘snowballing’ methods of communication. All nineteen were contacted through telephone 
while the six which followed through with the interviews maintained contact through 
email. All potential participants were sent details about the research and copies of 
consent forms prior to scheduling meeting times. While half of the respondents took 
advantage of the offer to assess their individual interview transcript prior to analysis, 
none suggested any changes. Pseudonyms are used throughout this thesis to protect the 
farmers’ identities. 
An important consideration concerning the availability of farmers to participate in 
the interviews was the research timing. Some farmers may have been excluded from 
analysis if they were heavily engaged in crop farming as well as dairy farming, since the 
interviews were set to take place during harvest season. Thus there are also concerns with 
the sample size since only six participants followed through with the interviews. Given 
the qualitative nature of the research, including non-random sampling and the selection of 
interviewees through personal connections, the findings cannot be generalized to family 





thematic analysis can be reached as early as six interviews, thus the quantity of 
interviews is not entirely negative. 
All farmers resided and farmed in a rural county in southern Ontario, and desired 
to have the interviews take place in their homes. Of the five which were currently in the 
process of integrating family members as partners or changing the farm ownership, four 
of them had these individuals on premise during the interviews and three desired to have 
them also take part in the interviews. All ‘head-farmers’ were male at varying stages of 
their careers, although one partner-to-be was female. The farms ranged from 250 to 450 
acres, part of which accommodated between 80 and 200 cattle (a fraction of this number 
are used for milking at any given time). The participants all self-identified as family-
farmers, where dairy farming was their primary employment. They owned at least part of 
the farm land, considered themselves as their own boss, including the majority of farmers 
employing hired labourers.  
The focus of the interviews involved two main goals. First was a partial test of IA 
theory through examining the level of self-interest as a driving force for behaviour, as 
well as comparing discussions of business and family values (the family representing 
non-economic institutions to question the balance of institutional power). The second 
goal concerned answering the research questions of how the farmers experienced food 
safety laws and regulations, focusing on how that experience impacted their control in 
milk production behaviour, and who they felt was responsible for safe milk. Participants 
were also encouraged to speak about any issue they felt was important to the discussion, 





the participants were thankful for the opportunity to voice their opinion and all six have 
requested a copy of the final research project. 
Results 
Legal Discourse 
Food safety laws and regulations involving the food recall process exhibit 
elements of both the neoliberal culture (American Dream) and an agribusiness structure 
(imbalance of institutional power toward economic dominance). More specifically, the 
comparison between business values and food safety values exemplifies both the 
devaluation of noneconomic functions and the accommodation of social values to 
economic values as outlined in IA theory. When the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA) was created in 1997, none of the justifications for its creation included or 
emphasized food safety (CFIAA, 1997). Rather, the government created the CFIA in 
order to enhance food inspection efficiency, while minding its cost-effectiveness and 
promoting trade (CFIAA, 1997). Meanwhile, where food safety is concerned in all 
associated legal texts, it is discussed predominately in relation to its marketability. For 
example, a dairy product cannot be marketed unless meeting certain standards (CDPR, 
1979) including pasteurization (FDR, 1978), and a diseased cow cannot be sold (HAA, 
1990). Also, it is illegal for an individual to “label, package, treat, process, sell or 
advertise” a food in a deceptive way (FDA, 1985), and an individual cannot sell unsafe 
milk nor can a manufacturer purchase unsafe milk (FDR, 1978). The existence of unsafe 
milk is not devalued or illegal. Rather, the processes of monetary exchange involving 
unsafe milk are harmful or illegal. Further, it is not explained if ‘selling’ also refers also 





the institutional balance may shift to demonstrate the penetration of economic language 
across the dairy system, overriding attention to food safety.  
Such a discourse exemplifies the idea that farmers lack control over the final milk 
product they are producing.  However, farmers were a rare inclusion within the legal 
texts overall. The term ‘farmer’ was not explicitly utilized, leaving the role of the dairy 
farmer to be defined through the term ‘producer’. The majority of uses of the producer 
term were connected to ideas involving product marketability (see above) which is not a 
direct concern for dairy farmers in the provincial quota system organized through the 
Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO) organization, since farmers do not sell product directly 
to consumers. Beyond ideas of selling, the only other areas in which farmer processes 
were discussed, involved dealing with food safety inspectors and farm property 
inspections. Overall, this suggests that the farmers’ behaviours are not directly controlled 
externally (re: legally).  
This is in line with the neoliberal cultural understanding of self-interest as the sole 
motivation for individual conduct. The lack of legal conditions attached to the farmers’ 
practices allows them to use whatever means they deem most efficient to reach their 
goals (re: producing milk). However, there is a limit to the opportunities of self-interest, 
as also portrayed in the institutional imbalance. For example, there is a separation 
constructed between the farm business and the farmers’ household property. Regulations 
demand that living quarters lack direct access to farm operations (CDPR, 1979), and that 
during inspections, separate warrants are required for both the farm and the home (FDA, 
1985; HAA, 1990; CAPA, 1985; CDCA, 1985). However, when an area is declared 





(HAA, 1990). Farmers control over the practice is also limited through an emphasis on 
animal tagging and traceability systems, especially evident in the Health of Animals 
Regulations (1978).  
Thus the neoliberal culture and agribusiness structure are exhibited in food safety 
laws and regulations, to the extent that farmers have control over how they produce milk, 
but such self-interest is conditioned by forms of concern for food safety. When the level 
of food safety concern is lower than infection-declaration or recall-status, economic 
interests associated with dairy products’ marketability dominate the legal discourse. 
There is the possibility that formal concerns for food safety act as a veil for economic 
concerns. For instance, there are possible negative financial consequences on the dairy 
industry if an unsafe product reaches a large enough audience. The industry must discard 
the contaminated product and the potential sales from that product, and perhaps also 
experience a decreased demand for such products from conscious consumers. However, 
as far as the legal content, farmers are able to pursue their self-interests in part, namely 
concerning dairy production but not the milk product, in an environment which 
emphasizes economic interests on the condition that social interests (re: safe food) remain 
outside CFIA-related enforcement.  
 Beyond the fact that food safety is not defined as a priority within the act which 
constructed the CFIA, it lacks a direct and formal definition with the legal texts. Different 
laws and regulations present partial understandings of food safety. For example, the 
Canadian Dairy Products Regulations (1979) emphasizes production methods by stating 
that the dairy product must be produced in a sanitary manner and be uncontaminated and 





on the milk product, emphasizing the need for pasteurization and no additives except 
vitamin D. The Health of Animals Regulations (1978) brings in ideas involving the 
animals, by defining food safety as a consequence of effective tagging and traceability 
systems of cows. The overall impression suggests that milk safety involves unadulterated 
milk that is produced in sanitary conditions and is not marketed in a deceptive manner.  
However there is an important power relationship underlying this definition 
which must be considered. The CFIA, including the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-
Food, is only able to enforce issues relating to nutrition, health, or safety, while the 
administrative concerns lie with the Minister of Health and the Food and Drugs Act 
(FDA). This means that food safety concerns are not defined by the same actors which 
enforce food safety recalls, which may lead to consequences of miscommunication or 
rebellion against enforcing issues deemed insignificant to the enforcer. More importantly, 
the Minister of Health likely has different interests than the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agri-Food. For example, the health department focuses on human subjects where food 
safety predominately becomes a concern as it relates to human consumption as a reaction 
to human digestive harm. This focus neglects other issues involving more proactive food 
safety issues like how food is produced, which has already been pointed out to be largely 
unregulated. 
With the legal texts offering a vague definition of food safety, logically there is a 
similar lack of understanding of who is responsible for food safety. As food safety is 
emphasized through the marketability of food, it is suggested that direct responsibility for 
unsafe food would be associated with those who are selling that food, recalling that it is 





The CFIA website defines a food recall as a company’s removal of an unsafe product 
from market (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, March 19 2012), where the blame is 
associated with the company. Meanwhile, the FDA (1985) stresses the importance of 
regulations in preventing consumer deception, yet neglects to suggest who is doing the 
deceiving. Considering that the food system is holistic, or perhaps that ‘producer’ is a 
type of antonym to ‘consumer’, it becomes logical to assume that consumers are deceived 
by producers. There is no mention of the possibility that producers can be the ones being 
deceived as well. But narrowing the blame to producers does little to understand food 
safety responsibility as there are a multitude of steps involved in dairy production. 
Whether the blame is on food companies or producers, the consumer is deemed as an 
innocent party – an idea which contrasts the findings in the literature review.  
Farmer Interviews 
The results of the interviews were coded into four main themes. The first two 
themes concern the establishment of the level of support that IA theory can offer towards 
understanding the extent that the neoliberal culture and the agribusiness structure impact 
dairy farming on Canadian family farms. Namely, the first two themes originate from the 
theory-testing portion of this thesis. The first questions the extent of an anomic 
environment, while the second evaluates the power (im)balance between the values of the 
family and the farm. The final two themes respond to the research questions via 
deductive reasoning. The third theme analyzes how dairy farmers experience food safety 
regulation, while the final theme answers the question of food safety responsibility. 
 Self-interest and control. The participating dairy farmers were quick to express 





the modern farm experience by asking “you have to decide who owns who - do you own 
the farm or does it own you?” The participants were very firm in their beliefs that they 
had significant control over milk production on their farms, where responses included ‘a 
lot of control’, ‘full control’, and ‘almost ultimate control’. All agreed when asked if they 
thought they were their own boss, while one suggested that this was the whole appeal of 
farming. When compared to the dairy processors, one farmer stated that the processors 
had some power in deciding to reject milk from particular farms and likely were involved 
in pressuring for a lower somatic cell count, but the majority of participants stated that 
the processors had no power over the running of their farms. When control was 
generalized to include off-farm environments, the farmers lost this sense of power. Casey 
commented “how much power do we have? Zero…The processors always say how much 
they want…we just have to supply them with a product they want”.  
All of the farmers recognized the similarity between their production practices 
and how they are told to produce safe milk, but three questioned the ‘being told’ aspect, 
where one went as far as to explain a desire to produce safe milk regardless of any 
requirements. These findings are consistent to all six farmers responding that they did not 
feel alienated from the practice of dairy farming. Half of the farmers even believed they 
enforced their own practices. One farmer actually directly acknowledged the self-interest 
ideology within the neoliberal culture. When talking about the power relations with the 
dairy processors, Morgan stated “that’s a capitalist economy. You can’t complain about 
that, right? They’re looking somewhat after themselves first, and then secondary to keep 
us in business”. However, a common theme throughout the interviews was that dairy 





the participants stressed that this desire was a significant motivation, along with or apart 
from industrial standards. 
 
Of the daily practices which they were currently doing, five of the farmers felt that 
they were required to do these practices, while two noted that they can do some things 
that are not required which are above and beyond, such as allowing the cows outside for 
exercise. Similarly, when asked how the dairy industry would define a good dairy farmer, 
two farmers felt this would involve the extent which the farmers followed the rules. For 
example, when questioned ‘so a good farmer would follow their rules?’ Alex replied “we 
haven’t got much choice”. Some farmers acknowledged the possibility to override the 
forms of control, through both legal and illegal methods, but only to a certain extent. 
Alex continued, “do we cheat sometimes? Yes. I think we’re all law breakers to some 
degree. But as far as the safety of food, we would never try to sell something that was 
illegal, or that was going to hurt somebody”. Along with these personal motivations, the 
majority of the farmers noted the overarching power of the law. To illustrate, Taylor said, 
Figure 2: Examples of Conditioned Control 
 
“If you want to stay in the industry, you need to meet requirements. So you have some flexibility in how you 
meet those requirements, but they have to be met.” (Morgan) 
 
[Why don’t you do anything to your milk before sending it?]  
“We can’t. Not allowed. Huge penalties.” (Riley) 
 
[Do you ever think to yourself, ‘what would the industry want me to do’?] 
“We’re usually told what the industry wants us to do.” (Jamie) 
 
[How much control do you feel that you have over producing milk on your own farm?] 
“Oh we have full control in terms of how we want to produce it, as long as we meet the laws and 
regulations… What we do here is alright, but we can only do as much as what they will allow us to do.” (Alex) 
 
 
The participants all agreed that they held a large amount of control over producing milk on their respective 
farms. However, as the quotes above exemplify, the farmers often conditioned these statements directly, or 
brought up a level of external determining factors which impact their agency in producing milk throughout 
other discussions. The farmers felt subdued by their environments yet simultaneously promoted their 





We’re still responsible for the quality of milk that leaves the tank. I mean, 
regulations – they’re still going to catch you if you don’t, but I guess you 
could still make the decision to cut corners. Short term, if you want to. I mean 
that’s going to catch up with you, because of the regulations that we do have. 
On several occasions, farmers communicated that any hostility towards feeling not in 
control was due to poor communication with the industry. If there was any 
communication at all it was minimal. Some farmers were very frustrated with this, and 
when asked if they ever think to themselves ‘what would the industry want me to do?’ 
they expressed their lack of power in industry decision-making: “...We tend to find out 
rather quickly [Taylor]. Yeah, and that’s not our choice. We’re not even involved in that 
discussion [Morgan]. It’s not a conversation that’s ever had. Like even with this new 
programming, it was passed. And then farmers were told about it [Taylor]. That’s the 
problem [Morgan].” Meanwhile, some farmers acknowledged they would hear a lot more 
from the industry if there was a farm-level quality issue. Of the discussions that did 
occur, they were defined as one-sided and aggressive by Jamie: “We have annual 
meetings and stuff like that where they go over stuff and [we] get an earful – on 
especially stuff they’re trying to shove down our throat.” 
Thus when farmers were questioned directly about how much control they have 
over milk production, the levels were very high, but further discussion acknowledged a 
multitude of conditions and limited flexibility experienced by dairy farmers. However, 
when farmers were faced with the level of control they had over the milk product, their 
perceived power faded. When directly asked if they felt alienated from the milk product, 





pasteurized skim milk as ‘white water’. Milk had become detached from the farm and 
from those who produced it. For example, while all farmers agreed they had no choice in 
where their milk went, two of the farmers expressed interest in being able to go to a 
certain store or pick up a certain brand of milk and be able to declare it their product. 
Perhaps this exemplifies the desire farmers have to regain control of something they 
currently do not have. A recent policy change called the Canadian Quality Milk (CQM) 
program was especially attacked for creating disengagement between the farmers’ 
production practices and the final milk product. For instance Jamie explained how “we’re 
doing all this work and we’re not putting out a better product by doing this stuff,” while 
Morgan explained how “they’re fixing something that’s not broken and they’re not the 
ones incurring all the extra work and costs… it’s not any safer than it was before.”  
Economic prioritization. The level of control farmers feel they have over milk 
production has an important connection to economic concerns. Even though five of the 
farmers felt required to do certain production practices, two of those justified doing these 
by if they desired to have a successful business or to stay in the industry. Further, while 
all six farmers believed these production practices were in line with how they are told to 
produce safe milk, three of them connected this link as being necessary in order to make 
money. Even though most farmers believed they were the most important step in the 
dairy industry (“nothing else would happen without it” [Jordan], and “without the dairy 
farmer there is no dairy industry” [Morgan]), farmers on average worked 70 hours per 
week and many of them or their family were involved in supplemental or off-farm 





time into farming in order to be successful. For example, one farm relied on the 
introduction of cash-cropping in order to financially support both primary farmers.  
 Yet overall, economic considerations were not prioritized throughout the 
discussions. When farmers were asked why they farm dairy cows, all of their reasons 
involved tradition or habit, with a desire to continue, while only one mentioned its 
profitability. Likewise, all farmers wanted a family member to take over their farm one 
day, but most conditioned their statements with an ‘if they want to’ concern. The reasons 
for this were not linked to economic concerns, where one farmer stressed that the 
decision to continue farming was in enjoyment not money, while Jamie prioritized family 
tradition: “The biggest thing is to continue the tradition that we have – like that’s the 
thing. It’s a business, but it’s much more than a business. And it’s part of the family, 
when you look back that far.” At some point during the interviews, half the farmers 
brought up the positive aspects of raising a family on a farm, including learning a good 
work ethic and having parents fairly accessible, but not because it is profitable. So even 
though the practice of milk production had very limited connection to economic values, 
milk as a product was somewhat more connected to monetary interests. For instance, 
when asked if they had any nicknames for milk, Alex replied “no, unless it’s bad milk” 
(suggesting that bad milk was not sellable), while Jamie recalled that his grandfather used 
to call it “liquid gold”. But overall the farmers did not connect their role as a farmer to 
business terms, and none of the farmers believed that society associated dairy farmers 
with economic-related values. 
Economic values did not appear to penetrate the farmers’ family values. When 





economic-related values (but Casey mentioned “enjoy your job,” while another farmer 
believed general values were changing and pushed towards more economical efficient 
thinking). Yet the comparison between family values and business values was quite 
difficult for the farmers, largely because half of the farmers believed the two were not 
necessarily separable. Taylor suggested that “farming is not a job, farming is a lifestyle.” 
All the farmers agreed that their family values and business values were very similar and 
neither preceded the other in time or importance. When asked if they consider their farm 
a family-farm, all replied yes (defined by participants as a farm that is mainly operated or 
owned by family, who make the key decisions, where the farm has some element of 
heritage while acting as a principle source of employment and income for a number of 
family members). Within their definitions, some farmers made note of how a family-farm 
differed from a business-centered farm. For example, a family farm may include a farmer 
keeping his favourite cow even if her production is not as efficient as required, or the 
differences in how employees are treated, where Riley exemplified a family-farm through 
the relationship involving parents: 
My dad still does what he’s able, and a family farm would make room for 
him. Make adjustments. But there are times when I will see him going away 
on a tractor and I just want him alive. And that there’s no way that makes 
good business. Like a business wouldn’t do that. 
This integration of farm and family values was viewed positively overall. More 
specifically, the majority of farmers believed their farm businesses were positively 
influenced by the family-farm status of their farm, due to the importance placed on 





and concerned while putting in more hours. Interestingly, all farmers expressed that they 
do not spend as much time with their families as they desired, yet when asked how much 
family time involved work or farm-related issues, all the farmers noted significant 
proportions ranging from a lot to ‘just about every minute’ or 24 hours a day. It was 
unclear if there simply was not enough family time, or if the prioritization of farm 
business interests had decreased a certain type of quality family time. 
Legal experience and production. In general, the farmers had very little 
knowledge of food safety laws and regulations, or an understanding of the food recall 
process and the CFIA. Yet they maintained a negative view of the laws, especially 
critical about not understanding why the laws were made. Morgan argued that  
It’s driven from the wrong side of the industry for sure. And there’s – and 
dairy farmers aren’t going, ‘man, I wish we had some rules because Joe over 
there up the road is really ruining our reputation’…You keep adding these 
burdens – everybody already knows dairying has lots of its own troubles and 
seven days a week, etc., but who’s thinking about ‘I wonder what we can do 
to add to that?’ 
Others were a bit more passive, such as Alex who said “until you understand [the laws], 
then you accept them and then you learn to agree.” But there was a significant level of 
frustration over some legal policies in particular, such as the CQM program. There is a 
type of controlled conflict between the law maker and the farmer receiving those laws. 
For example, in reaction to some food safety laws, Morgan argued that “you see stuff that 
you just know the guy has never seen the back end of a cow or spent a day with the dairy 





terms, other than some indirect mention of pasteurization and being above standardized 
levels. There were some similarities between their own definitions and how farmers 
thought the law defined safe milk, but there were additional characteristics within their 
personal definitions, including healthy cows and the element of taste. But overall the 
farmers believed that the legal definition impacted their milk production practices, noting 
that they had to abide the standards, but the laws and regulations did not impact their 
production practices. This difference may be conflicted by the fact that the majority of 
the farmers believed it was important that they had to want to produce safe milk 
themselves, outside any legal control. For example, Casey stated that “we are made to 
produce a safe food, but I truly believe that it has to be your decision,” while another 
farmer explained how he was only able to answer many of the interview questions by 
thinking about producing a good product, not thinking about following legal standards. 
 When the discussion moved to food recalls specifically, the farmers continued to 
convey that they had limited understanding and experience. Overall they defined a food 
recall as occurring when a food was substandard or had something wrong with it, but 
Riley said that a food recall was “an indicator that the system, by and large, works.” The 
purpose of a food recall, according to farmers, was to fix a quality problem, maintain the 
safety of food, and protect consumers’ health, safety, and confidence. However none of 
the farmers had personally experienced a food recall, but they believed the potential 
impact would be devastating throughout the dairy industry, including personal fines, the 
closure of farms, a decrease in the quantity of milk in the system, and a possible decrease 
in the level of consumption. Two of the farmers noted that they did not believe a recall 





testing and checkpoints milk must pass through before commercially sold. But all agreed 
that more recalls do not necessarily mean milk is less safe. Rather, farmers argued it 
meant “they’re watching it all the time” (Casey), “we’re doing our jobs as a keeper of 
food safety” (Alex), or even the complete opposite where “more recalls mean a safer 
product” (Sam) or that “recalls ensure safety” (Taylor).  
Responsibility for food safety. Overall, farmers believed that the level of control 
they have over milk production correlates to having responsibility for producing that milk 
safely. When asked who else was responsible for safe milk production, all the farmers 
answered ‘everyone’. However, the structure of the industry, through the segregation of 
stages, gave most farmers the perception that they were only responsible for the safety of 
milk within the farming stage (see Figure 3: Segregation of Responsibility). Further, 
farmers often blamed the processor for unsafe milk, justified by arguing that the milk 
coming off the farm is tested at great lengths: 
Probably a lot of it with this [unsafe milk] would be the processor because 
they’re the responsible – to make sure that the quality coming out of that 
plant or whatever, does meet those [standards]. Cause we have to meet it at 







Responsibility was frequently connected to the quantity of testing procedures, 
which enabled the participants to evade potential blame: “In today’s testing I just 
can’t see that it’s going to get to the consumer level” (Morgan).  
  When thinking about the industry as a whole, all the farmers said that the 
industry made them feel ‘very responsible’. However, half the farmers felt the 
industry blamed dairy farmers for (un)safe milk. Yet the majority of farmers did 
not perceive that consumers directly make them feel responsible for producing 
safe milk (Alex went as far to say “it’s not my problem, because there’s so much 
that can happen from here to the consumer”). Half of the farmers linked this 
response to the lack of education or awareness which the general consumer has of 
the realities of modern dairy farming. Multiple farmers brought up the idea that 
they felt responsible for, or felt it was part of their job, to educate the public and 
instill consumer confidence in dairy products. For example, Jamie acknowledged 
Figure 3: Segregation of Responsibility 
 
“Once it’s picked up it’s out of our hands.” (Riley) 
 
“Once it’s literally out of the tank it’s not ours [Jordan]. Once it goes into that truck it’s completely out of 
our control. Completely [Jamie].” 
 
“We’re responsible for our part. Once they start handling it, then the responsibility changes.” (Sidney) 
 
“What happens to the raw product is our responsibility. As far as the rest of it, we’re pretty limited in what 
we can do.” (Jamie) 
 
“I feel very responsible because it starts on our farm, right?” (Morgan) 
 
 
These quotes showcase the segregation of blame for (un)safe milk products as perceived by the 
participants. Although all the farmers felt significantly responsible for safe milk production, they only held 
onto this level of responsibility when they were in control of that process or product. Control was strongly 
correlated to physical ownership or presence on the local farm. When asked about food safety 
responsibility in general, the participants agreed that the entire dairy system was responsible, but the 






“that’s part of our job now, whether we like it or not…Because they’re so far 
removed from the farm anymore.” Simultaneously, dairy farmers linked their 
feelings of importance to responsibility for milk production in general. The 
following conversation exemplifies this idea: 
People could still come straight to the farm and get milk. They can do without 
the processor. You can’t do without the dairy farmer. All the retail and all the 
processing, that can fall away and you could still have a dairy industry 
[Morgan]. I also think that also gives us a unique responsibility too though. 
Because we are at the start of that, so it’s our responsibility to make sure that 
the product that’s coming out of our farm is clean and safe for consumption 
[Taylor]. 
Specifically during a food recall, half of farmers felt that everyone would be held 
responsible while two were more specific (Morgan said the “source of the problem” 
would be responsible, while Casey said “if it’s a recall it’d be processor”). When farmers 
were asked how they would feel if they were held responsible for a food recall, all of 
them replied with a negative descriptor (terrible or awful) but four of them qualified their 
answer with the assumption that they were actually guilty. For example, “I’d feel very – 
like if it was legitimate I would feel very badly” (Sidney), or “Like shit. If you’ve been 
proven to it” (Jamie), or “I’d feel awful. Like if it was our fault, that’d be horrible. That is 
my worst nightmare” (Taylor)! When asked if being or feeling responsible was their 
decision, the farmers replied yes, although most conditioned their statements with limited 





The following two questions were asked to be responded with the first thing that 
came to the farmers’ minds. First, they were asked who is responsible for safe milk, and 
the majority replied ‘everyone’, while two said it was the dairy farmer. Second, they were 
asked who is responsible for unsafe milk, and the answers drastically varied: Two 
farmers responded with ‘everybody’, one farmer with “the dairy farmer”, one farmer 
suggesting not the farmer (“we can never produce unsafe milk – wouldn’t want to” 
[Riley]), and two farmers suggesting that it depends on the situation.  
Discussion 
This thesis is centered on connecting the two themes of food safety 
individualization of responsibility and the illusion of control over food production by 
dairy farmers. This relationship, for a group of six Ontario dairy farmers, was determined 
by analyzing how family-farmers experience the legal structure of food safety. Overall, 
the legal texts exemplified some (limited) qualities and consequences of the neoliberal 
culture and agribusiness structure, but food safety laws and regulations were not 
perceived by the participants as influential in their dairy production livelihoods. In 
essence, at the local level (re: on the farm), the participants felt substantial control and 
individualized food safety responsibility, sometimes suggesting self-blame and other 
times deflecting the blame onto other areas of the dairy industry (re: processors). On a 
more structural level (re: farm is just part of the industry), farmers felt limited in their 
agency and therefore felt that food safety responsibility is systemically placed.  
The discourse analysis of the food safety laws and regulations found that the 
independent variables within the agricultural-anomie-alienation theoretical framework 





dairy farms. The legal analysis revealed a degree of institutional imbalance, where 
economic interests dominated the values of food safety. Namely, unsafe milk is only a 
problem when the product becomes involved in commercial or monetary exchange. This 
exemplifies the devaluation of noneconomic roles of milk. Within this economic focus, 
responsibility for safe food within the laws and regulations is understood through the 
prevention of consumer deception. The use of the term ‘consumer’ suggests that food 
harm is done by producers selling that harmful product. The existence of unsafe milk 
being produced is not an issue included within the legal texts. The law only becomes 
concerned with the economic realm of the dairy system.  
The extent of the neoliberal culture within the legal texts is exemplified 
disproportionality. The significant absence of regulatory control over dairy farmers’ 
production practices suggest that farmers are able to achieve their goals in any way they 
desire, only limited when food safety concerns reach a certain level. However, the 
emphasis on the marketability of milk products, within the legal texts, limits dairy 
farmers’ ability to determine the composition and characteristics of the product they 
produce. Thus the law limits the achievement of economic goals according to the 
farmers’ self-interests. Farmers are legally able to adopt an ‘anything goes mentality’ to 
produce milk, as long as that product meets other legal standards. Thus the legal texts 
suggest that dairy production behaviour of farmers is (sufficiently) controlled through the 
definition of milk product composition.  
However, because the participants had limited knowledge and understanding of 
the CFIA and the laws and regulations governing food safety, the power of ‘food safety 





mean that the participants were not influenced by some elements of the neoliberal culture 
and the agribusiness structure, but that they did not perceive the food safety laws as 
directly impacting their selves or their production practices. There is the potential that the 
participants were not aware of the impact food safety laws had on their daily production 
habits, but the farmers made it clear that they did not perceive their experiences to be 
significantly governed by the laws and regulations. This is not substantially surprising, 
given these legal acts and regulations govern the dairy industry at a federal level. As 
hinted to by some participants, the provincial laws or the rules of the provincial milk 
marketing board (Dairy Farmers of Ontario) may be significantly more influential than 
the federal legal texts. 
Evidence of the devaluation of social values (re: food safety and personal family 
values) and their accommodation to and penetration by economic values, was very 
limited. Beyond one farmer valuing ‘enjoying your job’, none of the participants included 
economic ideas when asked to declare their family values. Throughout the interviews the 
majority of the participants emphasized the value they placed on work ethic and being 
successful, but these ideas were not strictly related to either the farm business or the 
family. Thus this thesis cannot respond to Jensen’s (2002) critique of IA theory, as 
evidence of the socialization of economic values was inconclusive.  
Due to the intimate connection between the farmers’ families and businesses, it is 
incredibly difficult to identify specific interests or values associated with each separate 
institution. The participants themselves were either unable to dissociate one from the 
other, or found attempts to do so very challenging. None were able to say that either the 





connection between the institutions is symbolic of a penetrative level, but the 
participants’ at-length discussions of the importance of food safety, and the lack of 
economic concerns within family values, means that largely social values are not 
devalued and have not been overridden by economic-based interests. 
The accommodation of social values to business values shows the most evidence 
for IA theory’s institutional economic prioritization. Similar to the idea of penetration, 
the participants felt a significant amount of family time involved farm-related discussions 
or practices. However, the farmers expressed that they experienced a lack of desired 
family time. Therefore, for the participants, spending time with their families often meant 
that such time was based around farm or business issues, suggesting that the business is 
intruding on family life, or that the family routine is accommodating to the farm routine. 
Whether this exemplifies partial support to IA theory is not necessarily clear. There are 
important questions to consider when analyzing family farming businesses. Perhaps the 
geographical closeness or physical connection between the farm and the family home 
impacts the mental relationship between the farm and the family. The relationship 
between the two is even explained in the ‘family-farm’ title of which all the participants 
were happy to define themselves. The ‘farming is a lifestyle’ idea shows that the farm is 
not just defined through business concerns and labour, but other elements of non-
economic institutions are significantly involved. Thus is it not clear that the values of 
economic institutions are valued above the values of non-economic institutions, only that 
the interests of the farm sometimes intrudes on family life. 
 Similarly, evidence is also partial concerning the second factor – the emphasis 





motivations of neoliberalism were significantly experienced by the farmers through their 
ability to have control over their farm and how they were able to produce milk. However 
such power was conditioned by adherence to specific rules within the dairy system. 
Although the participants primarily perceived that they had limitless means to reach their 
personal goals relating to milk production, their statements were continually restricted by 
secondary thoughts concerning larger institutions. These included the legal regulations 
governing some of their behaviour, the economy stipulating the need to sell product and 
be profitable, and the dairy industry having a variety of rules, checks, and balances which 
constructed various requirements. There was a strong perception of self-control over milk 
production behaviours but ultimately through limited means.  
 There was a form of tug-and-pull that the farmers described regarding their level 
of control within milk production. While realizing to some extent the structural 
governance placed on their farming livelihoods, several farmers explained ways in which 
they returned (some) control to their own decisions and practices.  This was shown 
through examples of ways the farmers acted apart from the law, such as redefining safe 
milk beyond the ideas of pasteurization and low bacteria levels, where safe milk must be 
tasty and come from happy cows that have access to outside pasture. The most important 
way the farmers held control was through their internal motivation to produce safe milk. 
The participants clearly established that they do not purposefully taint their own milk. 
This agency needs to be considered in future research. 
Overall, the broader environment was not experienced by the participants as 
enabling individual desires, but the individual farm-level atmosphere was perceived as 





dairy farmers as caught in an illusion of control. The concept of alienation can help 
understand this illusion. As already suggested, the participants had a very weak 
understanding and connection to the actual legal texts concerning food safety. The 
participants did not believe that the laws and regulations impact their production 
practices, yet the farmers continually maintained a form of awareness about the laws and 
regulations impacting their production practices at a theoretical level through abiding 
standards. There is an idea of something controlling their behaviour, of which they are 
not fully aware, understand, or acknowledge. Also recall that the participants did not 
perceive there to be a separation between themselves and their milk production 
behaviours, but half the participants had some level of disconnect between themselves 
and the milk product. There is a lack of connection between the farmers’ labour and the 
product of their labour, a connection which Marx (1844) originally acknowledged as 
being concealed within the political economy system.  
This is shown by both the product and labour, individually, being somewhat 
independent from the farmer, but this independence is not directly perceived by the 
participants. The object of labour, the final milk product, is independent from the farmers 
(they are not allowed to do anything to it after it leaves the cow besides cooling, not 
containing antibiotics, with a specific butterfat ratio, etc.) and the farmers have become a 
type of servant to producing that product in such a way. This is true for both the 
commercially available processed milk and the raw milk on the farm. Simultaneously, the 
labour to produce this product is restricted through the composition of the product being 
produced, thus the labour itself also becomes controlled and somewhat alienated from the 





between their labour and the product they produce, yet they all perceived their labour as 
voluntary.  
This idea appears to be mostly driven through structural mechanisms, namely the 
production stages of the dairy industry. The labour was their own – producing milk was a 
mix of decisions and practices which they controlled, because they owned the cows. 
More importantly, they desired to own and care for the cows. This corresponds to 
Robert’s (1996) finding that control is maintained through connection to the biological 
stages of food production. However, the product was not only theirs – it was a symbol for 
success and money for them, while a symbol of nutrition for consumers. Farmers 
associated more control over what they were able to physically manipulate.  
This factor of ‘space’ (see spatial environment in Figure 1) and the impact of 
biological or physical control on feelings of power may involve an understanding of class 
consciousness. Although it is logical to state that farmers live according to their own 
decisions (power) due to the fact that they largely continue to control much of the 
biological aspects of farming (Roberts, 1996), this tie to the land may restrict farmers to a 
livelihood within the structures involving the means of production. For example, Walsh 
(2012) found that when rural communities in the U.S. compared themselves to states, 
governments, and corporations, individuals within the rural communities felt powerless 
and alienated, largely because these controlling organizations were out-of-touch with the 
values of their communities. There is a clear division between farm labour and the work 
involved in governing farming processes. While half of the participants acknowledged 





completely independent from the physicality of the farm – “you see some regulations that 
you just know for sure that this guy has never seen the back end of a cow.”  
Thus at some level, which only some of the farmers acknowledged, the laws still 
impact the biological growing stages and the farming practices connected to place. The 
connections farmers have to controlling local production suggest that dairy farmers 
believe their physical connections to the land and the cows authorize power to them in 
producing milk. Tandon (2010) explains this phenomenon as farmers increasingly 
becoming the ‘rural landless’ where they live on the land but lack decisive power in what 
is grown and for whom, resulting in an emotional divorce from the land. The 
consequence of this subordination results in farmers being the weakest element in the 
food industry (Buccirossi, Marette, & Shiavina, 2002).  
This structural division between labour and product, within alienated 
relationships, also has a key effect on feelings of responsibility for the milk product. The 
segregation of responsibility established that participants felt responsible for safe milk 
production while the (raw) product was under their care on their farm, but somewhat 
removed themselves from responsibility when the product was controlled by other stages 
in the dairy industry. This was justified by the excessive amount of testing of the product 
within traceability arrangements throughout the system. Therefore feelings of power and 
control (neoliberal culture) were not the only factor impacting the partial deflection of 
blame. There are also important considerations of some characteristics of the agribusiness 
structure (traceability testing procedures).  
These findings do not necessarily mean that forms of IA theory are not applicable 





understandings of systemic ideologies and structures. The qualitative nature of this 
research attempted to measure this ideology and structure through individual interviews, 
a process with potential problems. For instance, the participants simply may not be aware 
or want to acknowledge the existence and consequences of those issues. Some 
researchers have suggested that using micro methods to study macro concepts may 
potentially limit the understanding of the data to alternative interpretations outside the 
theory (Weick, 1995; Morgan, 1997). Other researchers have found that the structure of a 
theory can also enable connections which would not have been known from simple 
inductive methods (MacFarlane & O’Reilly-de Brún, 2012). The theory-testing nature of 
this thesis meant that the analysis likely suffered elements of blindness to ideologies 
beyond the agricultural-anomie-alienation theoretical framework. This is a limitation 
which needs to be addressed in future research involving food safety responsibility on 
Canadian dairy farms. However, utilizing an abductive approach, which embraces rather 
than ignores the theoretical positionality of the researcher (see Timmermans & Tavory, 
2012), enabled the addition of new ideas, such as the impact of the ‘spatial environment’.  
Further, being a family-farm is very important to the image of the participants, 
and this image was constructed through comparison to non-family or factory farms, 
which are very economic and business-oriented. The anomic individualistic culture is 
also connected to this comparison-identification, where choice and control are considered 
a key part of family-farming, while factory farms offer a structured chain of command, 
void of creativity. It becomes logical for anyone to define their role according to what is 





participants, it is the opportunity to have self-control and be creative which drove them to 
farm and what makes continuing farming an attractive option.   
Overall, the results show that the neoliberal culture and the consequences of an 
agribusiness structure (re: economic values) have not significantly penetrated dairy 
farming at the family-farm level, according to the perceptions of these participants. 
Future research should try to understand how and why family dairy-farmers in Canada are 
resisting these structural pressures. Further integration of IA theory with Marxist 
perspectives would help further enhance the ability to understand food crimes from an 
institutional anomic framework. In particular, an in-depth analysis of the degree of class 
consciousness which impacts dairy farmers would be helpful in understanding their 
experience of control and food safety responsibility within the Canadian dairy industry. 
One farming family outlined their suggestion: 
We should be focusing on better relationships between the producer, the 
CFIA, the health unit, and the DFO. Like specific to the dairy industry, so 
that all the people that are involved in all that, in the entire circle of 
production, are part of the solution. One person doesn’t have that specific job 
– [Taylor]. Or one department [Morgan]. Or one of those particular groups. It 
should be someone from all of those, able to brainstorm an ideal solution 
[Taylor]… 
Conclusion 
 This thesis offers findings that suggest the understanding of food safety 
responsibility as outlined in the agricultural-anomie-alienation theoretical framework 





perceptions and experiences of Canadian dairy farmers. The self-interest motivations of 
the neoliberal culture and the economic prioritization of the agribusiness structure were 
only partially experienced by the participants and had limited implications on their milk 
production practices. There is some evidence of alienated relationships between the 
farmers and their labour (indirectly) and the milk product (directly), which led to the 
participants deflecting some blame for food safety, yet continued to individualize food 
safety responsibility.  However, regardless of the legal structure suggesting that milk 
production habits are controlled through standardized requirements of the milk product, 
the participants persistently reasoned that they produce dairy according to their own 
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